Tuesday, January 10, 2012


S.O.S   e - Voice For Justice - e-news weekly
Spreading the light of humanity & freedom
Editor: Nagaraja.M.R.. Vol.08..Issue.02........14/01/2012

 “There is a higher court than the court of justice and that is the court of conscience It supercedes all other courts. ”
- Mahatma Gandhi

Editorial : Crimes  @  Reserve  Bank  of  India
-       An appeal to SUPREME COURT OF INDIA & central information commission
Ref  no. RTI APPEAL via web DPG/B/2008/80341
RBI is a public authority , set up by an act of parliament. Numerous
irregularities , illegalities , crimes have taken place at RBI , still
it is fully covered up by those in influential positions.

Just refer  “Oil for Food Money in Iraq scam ”  and “ Vostro Account Scam of 1990s”. Influential people are involved , everything happened under the noose of RBI , With the connivance of RBI officials ?

We requested the CPIO of RBI HQ for information as per RTI Act  ( our
letter dt 20th September 2008 ) about various issues concerning the
activities of that institution in whole. However the CPIO OF RBI HQ
through his letter no.DAPM.CO.RIA.4001/07.50.01/2008-09 dt October
03rd 2008 declined to give information citing certain ruses. ( RBI Ref
no. RIA 798/2008-09 )
He has stated that some information pertains to security press ,
nashik & note press at mysore. True , both those institutions are
fully owned subsidiaries of RBI , hence RBI is in a position to
answer. Still , RBI can transfer a copy of our RTI Application  to
those authorities as per provisions of Sec 6(3) of RTI ACT 2005. CPIO
didn’t do that.
One more ruse of CPIO of RBI is that , I am seeking his views /
opinions on issues concerning RBI activities. He is wrong , I am
seeking to know the official / legal stand of   RBI regarding it’s
activities for example , appointment of rowdies as loan recovery
agents by banks , etc. CPIO has failed to state the official stand
regarding various activities of RBI.
One more ruse given by CPIO of RBI is that I have raised many issues ,
to be specific 103 questions on various topics concerning RBI , giving
information on all those diverts the resources of authorities , hence
information request is denied. TRUE , information sought is many , so
do the crimes @ RBI which are also many. When compared to magnitude of
crimes @ RBI which is 3-4 times the entire budget outlays of Indian
government  to the tune of crores of rupees  , the resources spent to
ascertain information as per our RTI Application is just few hundreds
of rupees. When compared to the money spent by RBI officials by way of
TA / DA during their travel , etc, our information request resource
needs are peanuts.
To sum up , CPIO of RBI is hell bent to protect the criminals @ RBI
lest the truth comes into open. Hereby , we request the honourable
Supreme Court of India & central information commission  to order the RBI to give us truthful
information in whole , so that justice is given to those victimized &
fat criminals are sent to gallows. JAI HIND. VANDE MATARAM.
Read the article "Crimes @ RESERVE BANK OF INDIA"  @ http://theftinrbi.blogspot.com/
http://theftinrbi.rediffblogs.com/  , http://theftinrbi.wordpress.com/
Your’s sincerely,

The hawala trail

BRITISH officials are investigating the activities of one of the most prominent overseas backers of secessionist groups in Jammu and Kashmir. Last month, the United Kingdom's Charities Commission and the Metropolitan Police began looking into allegations that Ayub Thokar, the head of the World Kashmir Freedom Movement, had funnelled funds raised for charity to the terrorist groups.
Investigations into Thokar's role in funding terror began after Indian officials handed over evidence in the case to their British counterparts in June. The two Indian officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs and a senior Jammu and Kashmir Police officer made available details of funds funnelled from Thokar's charity, Mercy International, through Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank (since then renamed Standard Chartered Bank) and the Development Credit Bank. The investigators also provided transcripts of telephone intercepts and cases filed against the recipients of the funds in India.
On May 25, a long-running Intelligence Bureau operation led to the arrest of Srinagar-based journalist Imtiaz Bazaz. Officials claim that he was a key conduit for transferring funds to Hizbul Mujahideen field commanders in Jammu and Kashmir. On April 22 Bazaz had received a foreign currency remittance of Rs.4,84,875 into his account with Standard Chartered in New Delhi, and on May 15 a second remittance of Rs.14,98,000 into the Development Credit Bank. Although intelligence officials monitored the first transaction, they did not intervene, in the interest of building up evidence. The second transaction was frozen.
The funds trail led straight to Thokar. It transpired that in early 2001, Hizbul Mujahideen chief Mohammad Yusuf Shah had sent Rs.48 lakh to Jamaat-e-Islami leader Syed Salahuddin through Thokar. Subsequently, after the arrest of Jamait-ul-Mujahideen finance commander Qasim Faktu, Thokar began to finance his organisation through the terrorist's wife, Asiya Indrabi. Most of the funds were routed through Bazaz, who arranged for the transfer of funds received in New Delhi to accounts held with the Jammu & Kashmir Bank in Srinagar. Cash was then paid to the final recipients.
Meanwhile, Income Tax Department investigations against All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani have started to bear fruit (Frontline, July 5, 2002). The secessionist leader claimed an annual agricultural income of Rs.10,000 in his tax returns, and also received the official pension of Rs.85,200 due to two-term MLAs - ironically enough for a man now at the cutting edge of the secessionist anti-election campaign! His expensive house in Hyderpora, however, had several cars parked there and the household was run by a personal staff of 14 people. The monthly kitchen expenses amounted to Rs.25,000. Income Tax Department searches of the Geelani home also yielded Rs.10.25 lakhs and $10,000 in cash. Income-tax officials have now decided to impose penalties of Rs.30 lakhs on Geelani, based on his estimated income over the last six years, the maximum period allowed by law. His businessman son-in-law Altaf Ahmad Shah, who allegedly used his legitimate operations to launder funds, has been slapped with a Rs.40 lakhs penalty. Failure to pay could lead to the auctioning of Geelani's assets, including the Hyderpora home.
Separate income-tax penalties of Rs.2 crores have been imposed on businessman Abdul Rashid Saraf, who was allegedly involved in handling hawala funds sent to APHC chairman Abdul Gani Bhat. Saraf, income-tax authorities found, had failed to disclose income of Rs.3.37 crores over the last six years.
The vigour that the Income Tax Department has shown in this matter marks a welcome departure from the past. After it was driven out of Srinagar in the later 1980s by mobs that attacked income tax inspectors, the organisation had granted de-facto independence to the State. This time, two planeloads of officials flew into the Avantipora Air Force base and they were escorted to the raids by police officers. Their successes seem to have convinced the Income Tax Department that it is after all possible to play a useful role in Jammu and Kashmir.
In the U.K., both Mercy International and Thokar will now have to answer some hard questions. For one, there is no explanation why the organisation did not send supposed philanthropic donations to the several-dozen charities in Jammu and Kashmir which have clearances under the Foreign Exchange Management Act. Thokar will also have to explain how he paid for the purchase of his London home, and his regular overseas travels, given the fact that he has no ostensible means of income. India has, however, chosen not to seek Thokar's extradition, since the fact that his wife is a U.K. national makes this outcome unlikely.
For India, British action in this case will be a key test of its loudly-advertised anti-terrorist stance. In March, sources told Frontline, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani had handed over to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw a dossier on the activities of secessionist groups in the U.K. Titled 'Misuse of British Soil by Kashmir Expatriates Based in the U.K. for Funding Terrorism in J&K', the document outlined many of the charges which investigations have now added substance to. Sources say the team that visited the U.K. pointed to Straw's promises to crack down on terrorism-related money laundering, and were told that criminal prosecutions would take place in the U.K. Earlier, the U.K. successfully prosecuted two Khalistan-linked British nationals involved in backing the Babbar Khalsa International.
If funds transfers to terrorist groups are effectively cut off, it will do not a little to cripple such organisations. The reasons are simple. While it is easy to send cadres across the Line of Control, actually sustaining their activities in Jammu and Kashmir needs an elaborate financial structure. Money is needed to pay for everything from food and shelter to informants, political support and the legal defence of arrested sympathisers. Since it is impossible to lug sacks full of cash across the LoC, illegal funds transfers come into play. For many businessmen in the Kashmir Valley, holding such cash for short terms has been a profitable, risk-free enterprise. Now the penalties imposed should persuade conduits for blood-money transfers that crime does not, in fact, pay.

Al-Qaeda routing money to India via Europe

New Delhi, Mar 6: European countries are being used as hot destinations by terror group al-Qaeda to route money to India, according to a report by Peruvian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).

The report said the FIU had found at least one case of such suspicious transaction by al-Qaeda every month and shared them with the US investigators.

"The FIU also reports tracking cases similar to that of an OFAC-designated (US Office of Foreign Assets Control) of al-Qaeda element moving money from Europe through Lima and on to India," the report leaked by Wikileaks, a non-profit media organisation dedicated to bringing important information to the public, quoting FIU head Enrique Saldivar disclosed.

"Asked if this al-Qaeda case was the first of its kind or they had seen similar cases before, Saldivar told NASOff that they see about one case a month," the cable said.

The FIU receives and analyses STRs, may request additional information relevant to cases or operations related to money laundering or terrorist financing, provides Financial Intelligence Reports (FIR) to the Public Prosecutor's Office, participates and/or requests joint investigations, and coordinates with foreign FIUs and entities.

"Of the 7,710 suspicious activity reports examined by FIU analysts in 2009, 781 resulted in financial intelligence reports sent to the Public Ministry for further processing and investigation.

"Based on these 781 intelligence reports, the FIU concludes more than 3 billion USD moved illegally through Peru''s financial sector in 2009," it said.

"83 per cent of this amount, according to the FIU, is related to drug trafficking. The other 17 per cent is reportedly related to fiscal fraud, corruption and illegal gun dealing. Currently, 308 of these intelligence reports are at various stages of investigation and prosecution in the legal system as compared to four cases in 2008," the cables read.

According to Saldivar, anti-money laundering efforts in Peru are hindered by several factors.

StanChart prospectus quiet about cases

Mumbai: Standard Chartered Plc, (StanChart) which is set to hit the market with the first ever issue of Indian depository receipts (IDRs) on 25 May, has not disclosed many pending cases against it for alleged violation of foreign exchange remittance norms in the draft red herring prospectus submitted to the capital markets regulator.
The alleged violations—17 transactions of drafts, one telex transfer and two cash transactions—go back to 1991-92, when the Enforcement Directorate (ED) found a series of forex violations made through the bank’s Mumbai branches to the UK.
ED is a government agency that looks into foreign exchange transactions.
The violations were discovered after ED investigated a number of banks, including Standard Chartered, in the aftermath of the Harshad Mehta scam that rocked the stock markets in 1991-92.
The ED complaint was filed in the court of chief metropolitan magistrate in Mumbai by enforcement officer S. Parvez in May 2002.
These complaints, which are still pending, charge the bank and its then chairman Rodney Galpin of “total violation” of the exchange control manual and provisions of then prevailing foreign exchange regulation norms.
Mint has reviewed copies of some of these case files.
The Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements (ICDR) norms, laid down by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi), require any firm floating a public issue to disclose all pending proceedings initiated for economic offences against the issuer or its directors, as well as the present status of such cases.
StanChart said that it has no “material litigation” to disclose. The bank’s spokesman Arijit De said the lender has applied the relevant materiality standard in arriving at the disclosures.
In response to an email questionnaire, he said the bank would comply with the applicable laws, regulations and international practice with regard to material information disclosure and uniformity of disclosures.
“Accordingly, in relation to disclosure on litigation, as provided under the provisions of the Sebi (ICDR) regulations, 2009, as amended, Standard Chartered Plc, as an issuer of IDRs, is required to disclose ‘material litigation’. In considering whether disclosures are necessary in relation to litigation, Standard Chartered Plc has applied the relevant materiality standard. On this basis, no litigation is required to be disclosed,” the email said.
Under Sebi rules, the so-called materiality of a case must be judged on three broad parameters: qualitative nature, litigation or defaults that may not be material at present but might have a material impact later, and litigations that may not be material individually, but may be found material collectively.
A questionnaire to Sebi on whether it has granted any special exemption to StanChart for the IDR remained unanswered.
A senior lawyer at a national law firm said: “All pending litigations that have a bearing on the issue should be disclosed in the prospectus as per ICDR regulations. Moreover, the issue of materiality varies from case to case and is subjective. If I were an underwriter, I would have disclosed the status of the cases and justified if the cases have any material impact on the company’s businesses or not, in the prospectus.” The lawyer did not want to be identified.
Market analysts say there is no definitive yardstick for deciding the importance of a case.
“Materiality is subjective and judgemental,” said Prithvi Haldea, chairman and managing director of Prime Database, a primary market tracker. “The merchant banker, issuer and lawyer can collectively take a call on whether a matter is material or not.”
However, if these matters are decided in court and proven to be material, the issuers, bankers and lawyers can be taken to court for substantial damages, he added.
The amount involved in the 17 transactions listed by ED and facilitated by the bank between February 1991 and September 1992 is Rs4 crore. The bank also allegedly facilitated a telegraphic transfer of Rs1.5 crore. ANZ Grindlays Bank, which was acquired by StanChart in 2000, allegedly helped the same entities transfer around Rs55 crore. Separate cases are pending against both banks in the matter.
According to the case files, Irish rugby player Keith Fairbrother was the key beneficiary of the transfers. He owned a company, Indo International, earlier known as Eastern Suburbs, based in the UK, but with bank accounts in both names in India as well as the UK.
Fairbrother is said to have facilitated a few import-export deals between some Indian firms and their counterparts in the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Since India and USSR had bilateral trade pacts, any payment to entities there needed to be routed through the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) with appropriate approvals and sanctions. Fairbrother, the files claim, broke these rules using various foreign banks, including StanChart.
Through his associate Kuldip Singh Sood in India, Fairbrother would collect Indian rupee drafts drawn by an Indian bank on its domestic branch. Allegedly with the connivance of StanChart, he would get them cleared without making any declarations or taking any approvals and credit the amount to a vostro account of StanChart London and Manchester. These banks would, in turn, transfer the amount to a beneficiary of the same name in the UK.
A vostro account is the local currency account held by a local bank for a foreign one. Such accounts are used for inter-bank transfers, and money transfers to non-residents need RBI’s nod. ED has charged that the bank and its then CEO violated these rules.
A senior broker, on condition of anonymity, said that as a matter of principle, the company should publish all pending legislation and leave the question of materiality to investors’ judgement.
“By choosing to ignore pending legislations, they are setting a bad example for the companies coming to list such instruments in future,” he said.

Excise scam money used to fund terror'

PANAJI: Opposition leader Manohar Parrikar on Thursday said he would write to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, fearing that money from a multi-crore excise scam linking Goa with Indian border states is being used to fund terrorist activities.
Parrikar has also alleged that the state excise department has been issuing permits to companies furnishing bogus addresses.
·                                 Incidentally, the state government's reply that the state finance secretary is investigating earlier allegations made by Parrikar on the excise scam has not satisfied the opposition leader, who has demanded that the matter be immediately handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Raising the matter during question hour, Parrikar said that illicit alcohol consignments worth crores of rupees are being sent to border states in the north and north-east of India.
"Money from this scam is being used to fund terror networks. The excise departments from other states such as Punjab, Rajasthan and the north eastern states are involved," he said. The opposition leader also reminded the House that he had first made these allegations in the last assembly session.
"I believe the prime minister is an upright person and I will write to him to probe into this," Parrikar said. Chief minister Digambar Kamat, however, did not commit to a criminal investigation into the scam.
"The finance secretary is currently conducting an inquiry into the matter," he told the House.
Parrikar retorted: "The finance secretary does not have powers to conduct such an inquiry. We have to verify the signature of the superintendent of excise on the order, which the finance secretary will not be able to do. He cannot go to Punjab and Rajasthan to investigate the matter."
"The only thing that needs to be investigated is who made the payment for the 1.04 lakh litres of alcohol that was imported in September. Trace the source of payment and you will find out who the culprit is," Parrikar said.

UBS deal died over unexplained money

Mumbai / Pune: The reluctance of a top Swiss bank to help Indian investigators is slowing the unravelling of an intricate multinational trail of money transfers—across Switzerland, New York, the British Virgin Islands and Pune—between an Indian horse owner and a fugitive Saudi arms dealer, according to officials in the Enforcement Directorate, the government body that investigates economic crimes.
A top official in the Enforcement Directorate (ED) who did not wish to be identified confirmed on Friday that the agency’s officials, in December 2007, had advised the Indian government not to clear a Rs467 crore plan by UBS (United Bank of Switzerland) AG, the world’s biggest wealth management company, to buy the Indian mutual fund business of Standard Chartered Bank because the Swiss bank had not helped track international money transfers of Pune horse owner Hassan Ali Khan.
Investigators from the ED, who recently claim to have found $8 billion in the Swiss bank accounts of Hasan Ali Khan, say they now have evidence of a $300 million transfer to him (via a Chase Manhattan bank account in New York) from billionaire Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi, whose arms supplies to Tamil terrorists, the LTTE, were revealed during an investigation into the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.
alt="Home turf: Hassan Ali Khan (second from right, in safari suit) with wife Rheema (second from left) and father-in-law Abbas Ali Khan (fourth from right). " title="Home turf: Hassan Ali Khan (second from right, in safari suit) with wife Rheema (second from left) and father-in-law Abbas Ali Khan (fourth from right). " v:shapes="_x0000_s1026">Home turf: Hassan Ali Khan (second from right, in safari suit) with wife Rheema (second from left) and father-in-law Abbas Ali Khan (fourth from right).
As the Bombay high court hears an Enforcement Directorate plea not to return passports to Khan and his wife Rheema, theHindustan Timeshas previewed a secret ED report that reveals the agency’s attempts to find the links between Khan and Khashoggi.
As evidence the report quotes a notation, “funds from weapon sales”, made by UBS AG, a top-tier investment banking and securities firm, after it froze an account belonging to Hassan Ali Khan, the Pune horse owner, following the $300 million transfer to him—it isn’t clear when— from Khashoggi.
“I would not like to talk about this,” said UBS India managing director and chairperson Manisha Girotra, referring all questions to the bank’s spokesperson.
“As a truly global entity, our policy on such issues is to comply with the laws and regulations in each host country, while at the same time, complying with the banking laws in Switzerland,” the UBS spokesperson said in an email. The spokesperson declined to comment specifically on the arms sale notation.
The government has told the Bombay high court that the Khans are “virtually absconding” and if they are allowed to leave India, investigations could collapse. Khan’s counsel, Milind Sathe, said his client “regularly appeared before the Directorate”. Asked where Khan was, his main lawyer, Mugdha Jadhav, said: “Can’t tell you, sorry.”
At Pune race course, HT found Hassan Ali Khan’s father-in-law, Abbas Ali Khan, who said his son-in-law was “not well” and in Mumbai. He dismissed all allegations.
Hassan Ali Khan has three Indian passports—issued from Pune, Patna and Mumbai; he also applied for passports from Guwahati and Chandigarh— and he and his wife have applied to Switzerland for citizenship, another ED official who did not wish to be identified said. Passport authorities in those three cities are now trying to find out how three passports were issued to Khan.
Kashoggi now lives a quiet life in the principality of Monaco. There is a British warrant out for his arrest.
Another top official at ED who also did not wish to be identified said Kashoggi’s $300-million transfer was “only the tip of the iceberg” and that the agency was trying to connect the dots in the global trail, which also includes evidence of another $290 million in two “fictitious companies” created by Hassan Ali Khan and a friend in the British Virgin Islands in the Caribbean. All the money transfers are recorded in a laptop seized in January 2007 from Hassan Ali Khan’s house in Pune and while investigators believe this is laundered money, there is no direct evidence. They would also need corroboratory evidence to establish that these transfers have anything to do with terror networks.
“These are all false allegations,” said Sathe. Asked about the $300 million transfer from Khashoggi, he said: “When the Enforcement Directorate questions us, we shall give a reply.”
The ED official, who confirmed the agency’s involvement in spiking UBS’ deal with Standard Chartered, said the Swiss bank had told Indian investigators to get a letter rogatory, a formal request from an Indian court to a Swiss court. This is a complicated process and would have needed to be routed through the ministry of external affairs, and it would have involved finding and presenting clear evidence of Hassan Ali’s links to terror.
It now seems apparent that UBS’ stand in the ongoing investigation led to the collapse of its deal with Standard Chartered Bank.
In a December report, Mint said that the Reserve Bank, India’s banking regulator, would not approve the deal because of possible money laundering through the Swiss bank involving certain transactions of Khan. On Friday, RBI declined to comment. “We are a civil body,” a spokesperson said. “Whenever we find violations, issued to be investigated, we hand over the information to the Enforcement Directorate. We have not issued any comments on the issue of UBS.”
In December, Standard Chartered, the parent of Standard Chartered Bank in India, sent a notice to stock exchanges in London and Hong Kong, where it is listed, saying it would not proceed with the deal, without giving a reason.(Hindustan Times)

- An appeal to honourable supreme court of India
The central bank of India  Reserve Bank Of India , which is supposed
to direct the fiscal policies of government of India , has failed to
do so. It has enabled many looters in the garb of entrepreneurs  , to
swindle the exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The premiere
investigating agency of India CBI has failed to nail the culprits.
Hereby , I do request the honourable supreme court of India to treat
this as a PIL application & to provide speedy justice in following
Read the article "Crimes @ RESERVE BANK OF INDIA"  @ http://theftinrbi.blogspot.com/
http://theftinrbi.rediffblogs.com/  , http://theftinrbi.wordpress.com/
Read the article "PF scam shame shame judges" @
http://corruptmajority.blogspot.com/ ,

-       Trauma of an old man

Complete case details also available at http://members.lycos.co.uk/ganapathihariram/
As per allegations of RBI management Bangalore in 1977-79 , criminal
nexus of RBI employees stole Rs. 220000 from RBI Bangalore. All the
banks , government treasuries in Karnataka , submit defaced / soiled
currency notes to RBI Bangalore in exchange for good notes. RBI after
collecting such defaced currency notes , sorts out fairly good notes
which can be reissued & burns off the remaining totally defaced
currency notes. All these process is done in a systematic manner.
As per allegations of the management , the crime took place in the
period of 1977-79 at RBI Bangalore. A nexus of employees, took away
the currency bundles meant for destruction & substituted it in the
place of bundles of reissuables.
Charge sheet issued by RBI Bangalore office to mr.G.Hariram
Staff no.3698/156/84-85 dt 1 april 1985
Amended charge sheet staff no 3798/156-84/85 dt 8 april 1985
CBI has charge sheeted 17 employees in connection with this case ,
case olde no. cc34/1989       new no.  sc 436/1991            . the
honourable 21 city additional city civil & sessions court Bangalore in
it's order dated 24.01.1992
   discharged        03  charge sheeted employees , as the prosecution
failed to prove the charges against them. They came out clean , as
they were innocents saddled with the crime done by others. One of the
charge sheeted employee who turned approver for the prosecution, has
given detailed account of the crime. Nowhere he has mentioned the
involvement of accussed no.15 mr.G.Hariram in the crime.
Even after coming out clean, mr.G.Hariram was not reinstated into
service by RBI. They gave the ruse of domestic enquiry & showed
contempt to the court order. On appeal, the honourable high court of
Karnataka ordered RBI to review it's order with respect to
mr.G.Hariram , still RBI failed to reinstate mr.G.Hariram into service
, once gain showing contempt to the court of law.
In India as per law , the decisions of court of law are binding on all
, orders of court over rides the organisation's internal rules ,
service rules , etc. inspite of lack of evidences, in a whimsical
manner the higher authorities of RBI , fixed some innocents as the
scape goats heaped all charges against them ( against whom they had
personal grudge , dislikes ). RBI  repeatedly showed contempt to the
court orders , dismissed the scape goat - ailing old man mr.G.Hariram
from service. RBI snatched away his PF money towards the alleged loss
to the bank , didn't pay his gratuity amount , salary arrears and
finally he was even deprived of the pension. As a result , the old man
has even lost his social prestige, dignity , his family suffered a lot
& he is a mental wreck today.
Why RBI authoroties are hell bent upon to send away the innocents /
scape goats away from service ? why CBI didn't conduct polygraph tests
of all the accussed , specifically higher officers of RBI , managers
of RBI office Bangalore ? probably the scape goats were aware of the
crimes master minded by higher ups & didn't co-operate with the higher
ups in their crimes. So, the criminals were afraid that the scape
goats will blurt out truth to the world , fixed non co-operating
innocents themselves as criminals.
Who will give justice to innocents like old man mr.G.Hariram & who
will bell the corrupt , criminals , fat cats of RBI ?

( SEE RULE 22 OF RTI ACT 2005 )

PIN – 570017.
WITH RESPECT TO CASE NO  old CC34 / 1989 & NEW NO SC436/1991   AT 21
CHARGE SHEET NO staff no.3698/156/84-85 dt 01.01.1985
Amended charge sheet  staff no.3798/156-84/85 dt 08.04.1985
1. Why didn't you notice the alleged crimes of 1977 , 78 & 79 till the
mid of  1979 ?
2. This crime came to light only due to anonymous phone calls of good
Samaritans to authorities , but not due to your inspection . is your
inspection division working properly ?
3. why there is no security check up of officers during entry & exit
out of premises ?
4. why there is no individual weighment , individual statement of
value of bags of reissuable notes & bags of note meant for destruction
, after sorting is done, why they are not tallied with total weight ,
value of notes issued for sorting ?
5. Immediately after noticing the crime, why did not you transfer all
the employees of those sections ?
6. why did not you take steps to preserve3 & protect respective
documents relating to such high profile crime ?
7. why didn't you immediately issue charge sheet to all the accussed &
waited till 1983 ?
8. Why RBI has left out , so many officers ( who worked in the same
sections for more period than accused officers ) from domestic
enquiry ?
9. why CBI also failed to put those people in the charge sheet before
the court ?
10. is it because they were in favorable terms with the vested
interests ?
11. did the CBI dance to the tune of vested interests in RBI while
preparing charge sheet & during investigation , instead  of
independent investigation ?
12. those left out probables from the charge sheet might have caused
the destruction of evidences / records. During the course of domestic
enquiry / court proceedings , it has been recorded that some records
have been destroyed. Are not CBI & RBI responsible for destruction of
evidences , aiding true criminals get away ?
13. in normal times , what is the period specified in RBI regulations
for preserving old documents / records ?
14. after noticing such a high profile crime the RBI must have taken
utmost care to preserve such old records for indefinite time , for
producing before courts of law as & when demanded. But it  didn't ,
why ?
15. does not this point to connivance of higher authorities of RBI ,
with the criminals ?
16. RBI authorities have conducted domestic mass enquiries , instead
of individual enquiries , is it not detrimental to the rights of
defense ?
17. RBI authorities have stated  that court proceedings & domestic
enquiry are independent of each other & are not binding on one
another. However  RBI authorities straight away took on record of
domestic enquiry the court statements , evidences , but didn't honour
the order of same court of law ? why this double standard by RBI ?
18. The alleged crime  was committed in 1977-79, but charge sheet was
framed in mid 1985 , why this long delay ?
19. didn't this facilitate the masterminds of crime to destroy ,
manipulate evidences ?
20. as stated before court , indeed some records , 22nd currency note
packet were missing , who is responsible for it ?
21. has the CBI conducted enquiry , polygraph test of RBI higher
officers - S.N.RAZDAN , W.S.SARAF , J.P.AWASTHI , J.MITRA & others ,
if not why ?
22. is it not due to inefficiency , negligence of duty by such high
ranking managers , that such a crime occurred in RBI Bangalore ?
23. what disciplinary action RBI has taken against the inefficient ,
negligent higher officials ?
24. whatever internal rules an organization makes must be within the
line of law. If such internal laws of the organization are violative
of law , fundamental rights of employees , such internal rules become
illegal. Are not the way of RBI disciplinary proceedings illegal ?
25. as per RBI pension regulations 1990 , RBI has the right to deduct
any loss caused to the bank , from the pension of RBI employee if the
misconduct of employee is proved in judicial proceedings . even though
mr.G.Hariram came out clean from the court , why  RBI has denied his
pension ?
26. judicial courts of law are appellate authorities over & above ,
domestic enquiry committees & judicial orders supersedes the domestic
enquiry proceedings. Still RBI showed contempt of court & didn't
reinstate mr..G.Hariram into service , why ?
27. even if an employee's misconduct causing loss to the bank is
proved , before denying him pension (towards making up loss to the
bank) , previous sanction of the central board of RBI must be taken.
But in mr.G.Hariram's case , pension was denied in full without taking
previous sanction of the central board of RBI , is it not illegal ?
28. RBI alleged that mr..G.Hariram caused loss to the tune of Rs.14000
to the bank & recovered it from his provident fund dues. There was
nothing left over to recover , still RBI  completely denied pension to
mr.G.Hariram , why ?
29. ideally, domestic enquiry findings / disciplinary actions should
be completed first , then the employee can appeal to appropriate court
of law. In mr.G.Hariram's case , CBI & RBI failed to prove the charges
in court of law , as a result court discharged him from the charges.
To cover-up it's failures RBI management dragged domestic enquiry much
beyond court orders date & gave findings indicting mr..G.Hariram. does
the enquiry officer of domestic enquiry think that he is over & above
the court of law ? is it not illegal & contempt of court ?
30. ideally , RBI authorities should have appealed to higher court
against lower court order discharging mr.G.Hariram from charges. But
it was not done , why ?
31. did the RBI pay interim relief to mr.G.Hariram , during suspension
period ?
32. the undue delay in filing charge sheet , consequent destruction of
key evidences , dishonour / contempt of court orders , undue haste in
giving findings , dismissal , denial of of pension without central
board's sanction , all point towards criminals within RBI higher
management. What disciplinary action has been taken against
J.P.AWASTHI, S.N.RAZDAN,J.MITRA, W.SARAF & others ? if not why ?
33. why charge sheet was amended? Is it legal ?
34. did the charge sheet was amended to falsely implicate
mr..G.Hariram , by including cancelled note vault in the charge
sheet ?
35. does not this itself show that it is not statement of actual
happenings / facts , but a cunning ploy to mislead investigation
towards fixed innocents from actual criminals ?
36. is it true that that only 5% of sample inspection is done out of
bundled verified defective note packets ?
37. is not the conduct of joint / mass enquiries of all charge sheeted
officers illegal ?
38. how come such an important evidence 22nd note packet went
missing ?
39. is it because it may point towards real criminals ?
40. as per the statement of management witness / inspection head /
expert mr.vijendra rao , the notes of earlier dates have been removed
from packets made into new bundles , right ?
41. as per his statement , entire certificates , seals of some asst
treasurers are there , who didn't work at all on that day is not it ?
42. does not it show that some body else was misusing the seals ,
putting some innocents seals over the notes ?
43. does it not show that , crime has taken place at verification
section ?
44. does it not show involvement of some asst treasurers ?
45. why asst treasurers have not been charge sheeted ?
46. why inspection of RBI Bangalore office was not done between 1975 &
1979 ?
47. is it not true that you failed to produce all records showing
internal inspection / audits , during domestic enquiry & court
proceedings ?
48. your expert mr.vijendra rao has stated that some seal marks are
smudged , he has stated some seal marks appears to be so & so. He has
clearly nowhere stated that this seal mark is exactly this , so he
himself is not 100% sure ?
49. your expert nowhere said that 100% sure this seal mark is this ,
on that day this seal was issued to mr.G.Hariram , isn't it ?
50. your expert says during 1975 , he didn't notice3 any fraud.
However approver says fraud was there before mid 1977 also. Why no
action has been taken ?
51. why you didn't produce all records of all persons , who have
specifically worked in alleged sections , the registers of those
departments with daily activity report containing seal nos , packet
nos , bag nos , etc ?
52. are not their chances of some criminals putting the seal marks of
innocent officers over the notes , bundles , bags , etc ?
53. your expert is not 100% sure of seal mark , your records are not
there to prove the presence of charge sheeted officers in the alleged
sections , neither your expert nor your records are 100% sure on what
date , at what stage , by whom crime was committed , isn't it ?
54. is not the charge sheet amounting to higher ups picking up
officers they dislike & falsely implicating them ?
55. is it not cunning ploy of higher ups to divert attention from
original criminals ?
56. why no action was taken against currency officer of 1977-79
mr.J.Mitra ? why his pension , super annuation benefits were not
withheld ?
57. what is your justification , supporting evidence , records for
picking up only three officers including mr.G.Hariram for legal
prosecution and leaving the majority of probables ?
58. why you have dropped charges against five asst treasurers ? why
you didn't even conduct domestic enquiry against them , let alone
legal prosecution ?
59. Is it RBI's & CBI's way of fair play & justice ?
60. as inly 5% sampling of verified note bundles are done , there are
more possibilities of rebundled packets getting unnoticed in relaxed
95% lot , isn't it ?
61. you have left out so many officers who worked in those sections,
some of whom even became management witnesses , instead of being
charge sheeted by the management, is it fair play & legal ?
62. who are the bank employees , from whom you have recovered the
alleged bank loss of Rs.220000 ?
63. were all of them charge sheeted , enquired , legally prosecuted ,
dismissed & their pension , gratuity withheld ?
64. you don't have any internal statuotary records to prove that
mr.G.Hariram worked in those departments , except a currency officer's
office note dated just on the eve of charge sheet years after the
alleged crime ? does it not prove that this note has been concocted
just to fix mr.G.Hariram ?
65. where as you have records of other officials attendance in those
departments , but not charge sheeted them why ?
66. three officers of staff grade A daily work in three sections out
of 40 officers , why you have picked up only mr.G.Hariram , out of
1095 working days , he has worked for only 223 days in those
sections , still those officers who worked for more days in those
sections are not charge sheeted why ? the approver , the management
expert witness , shift registers , V2 registers , Destruction
certificates , Form CD 55 , etc , nobody , no records were able to say
on what date , at what stage , by whom crime took place , also they
were unable to say on what date at what stage crime was committed by
mr.G.Hariram ? is it not futile imagination , cunning ploy of RBI
higher authorities to fix innocent Mr.G.Hariram ?
67. the management expert witnesses said , the most probable place of
crime is punching / Cancelled Note Vault , incinerator , where asst
treasurers were joint custodians . they were not enquired & let off
why ?
68.        the charge sheet alleges extraction / substitution of
defaced note packets. Where as the management expert witness say
substitution of defaced notes only ? is not there difference between
loss of one number of note & 100 number of notes ?
69.         as per the normal course of duty , staff officers does not
count notes in each bundles , but they just count the number of
bundles only. Is not there chances of inserted note bundles or bundles
containing less number of notes going unnoticed ? is it not the
failure of statuotary system of work practices ?
70.         does not all these prove higher authorities of RBI & CBI
were hell bent to fix mr.G.Hariram & to shield the original
criminals ?
Questions with respect to other cases :
71.         how do you monitor the work of bank officials nominated as
directors of companies which have availed bank loans ?
72.         how do you monitor the work of companies , in which banks
have invested ?
73.         how do you monitor the rapid wealth growth of certain bank
officials , who work in shares investment / equity funds section ,
etc ?
74.         inspite of project reports by bank officials , over
assessment of collateral securites / value of debtor companies by bank
officials , the loans become NPAs  & full value  cann't be realized in
the market by selling off the assets of debtor companies also. In such
cases , what action is taken against erring bank officials who collude
with criminal industrialists for availing higher amount of loan than
permissible ?
75.         give bankwise  specific figures of NPAs.
76.         give names of industrial groups / promoters whose
companies have become NPAs , so that public can be aware of them  ,
before investing in new companies promoted by them.
77.         is not collection of loan from debtors of bank through
rowdies / recovery agents , illegal ?
78.         why not criminal complaints filed against bank mangers for
aiding , abetting rowdism , murdering people ?
79.         if your method of employing rowdies to collect loans of Rs.
10000 from commoners is right , what would you do to a promoter of a
debtor company to recover loans of crores of rupees , supari killing ?
but debtors of crores of rupees is let off coolly by banks , why ?
80.         what is the exact amount of loss caused to the exchequer
by karim lala telgi who printed fake stamp papers ?
81.         what action has been taken against those involved ?
82.         have you taken action against all those mentioned by telgi
during narco analysis test , if not why ? is it because they are
powerful & bigwigs ?
83.         how you are controlling the illegal finance activities ,
money lending by individuals , pawn brokers & chit fund companies ?
84.         how you are monitoring the receipt of public donations ,
foreign donations by many NGOs ?
85.         how many erring NGOs , chit fund companies , pawn
brokers , individuals you have booked for illegal finance activities ?
86.  who were responsible for selling the good printing machine at
security press nasik to scamster karim lala telgi as scrap ?
87.  who recruited the candidates below merit rankings in R.B.I for
what criminal roles ?

No comments: